Patka helmets are indigenous concept of India to provide a light but effective protection to head. They are those tiny round shaped things usually can be seen with Indian armed personal in J&K . As they are smaller and do not look like typical helmets some time they are called as Head Protective Gear.
People has misconception about it that…
they are worthless helmets and not effective against modern fire arms.
WRONG!!
Reason to develop Patka:
Patkas were actually been developed for Sikh soldiers, as they wear their ‘Pagdi’ ( Turban ) always , so initiation was to make such a platform which can be fitted easily inside Turban.
Developed by:
securemobileindian.pvt.ltd
Material:
Currently newer system us made if Kevlar.
Advantages:
1) very light
2) comfortable
3) easily fitted on head
4) all weather usable system
5) all round high level protection ( except top side , only 9 mm protection there)
6) where as most of the helmets fail to give protection against 7.62 mm or 5.56 mm rounds, Patkas give protection against 7.62, 5.56 and 9 mm bullet protection!!
7) protection against 250×75mm Indian ball lead core rounds
8) Capable of using with NVG’s, Radio sets, Binoculars, Range finders etc..
Used By:
Rashtriya Rifles
CRPF
Indian Army etc.
Now you decide , is Patka a bad thing after all??
Members of Rashtriya Rifles with modern Patka helmets
G-Factor Helmet is a new generation combat helmet by MKU. Extra light weight with ultimate ballistic protection designed, these ergonomically designed helmets provide extreme comfort in combat zones. Made of light weight composite material, G-Factor helmets weigh below 1 kg and are much lighter than traditional helmets. The main advantages are……
1)Bolt free shell for uniform ballistic protection
2) Mechanically rigid & impact resistant
3) Ricochet damage control system
4) Heat insulated
5) Resistant to extreme temperature, flames and ultraviolet rays
6) unhindered communication even in noisy environment
1) One of the earliest explorations of the concept of the combat drone was by Dr. Lee De Forest, an early inventor of radio devices, and U. A. Sanabria, a TV engineer !
2) The modern military drone as known today was the brainchild ofJohn Stuart Foster Jr., a nuclear physicist and former head of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
3) The earliest recorded use of an unmanned aerial vehicle for warfighting occurred on August 22, 1849, when the Austrians attacked the Italian city of Venice with unmanned balloons loaded with explosives.
4) Ruston Proctor Aerial Target of 1916 which were successful against German Zeppelins, can be said first modern UAV.
5) Famous model/actress Marilyn Monroe actually had worked in Van Nuys Radio plane factory , which the then time were producing radio controlled drones, before she entered into modelling career !!!!!!
6) In the 1973 Yom Kippur War,Israel used unarmed U.S.Ryan Firebee target drones to spur Egypt into firing its entire arsenal of anti-aircraft missiles. This gave IAF a huge advantage and opportunity to establish aerial supremity .
7) Iran became the first country to use an armed modern drone, when one drone was equipped with 6 RPG-7 rounds and was against Iraq!
8) The first UAV war was 1991 Gulf War as in that war any time at least one drone was in the sky.
9) In December 2002, the first ever dogfight involving a UAV occurred when an Iraqi MiG-25 and a U.S. RQ-1 Predator fired missiles at each other. The MiG’s missile destroyed the Predator.
10) Iran is to be said first country to ‘hack ‘ and ‘ hijack ‘ a drone , as they captured a RQ-170 drone in 2011.
11) UAE Drones for Good is an international award for making drones for welfare of mankind.
Fishermen of Vizag-Vishakhapattanam were on their daily routine over waters, hunting for fish. But this time, they were trained by Indian Naval Eastern Command how to identify enemy ships especially submarine, as war had broken between India and Pakistan. At the midnight, they have heard a very big, mysterious explosion close to the outer bouys of the Vizag port.It was just a beginning of the dawn, some fishing boats saw the life jacket (one or two) floating. And sooner, they saw the piece of wreckage and oil spread over the sea water.
At the very morning, an IN vessel steering near the spot with Lieutenant Sridhar More on board.He was waiting for his divers.Soon, the first of the divers who went down to investigate surfaced after a few minutes and gasped.
“Sir, it’s a submarine.”
A second diver was sent in.He surfaced half an hour later, excited.
“I’ve felt the length of the submarine and its fin. The mouth is blown open.”
More punched out a signal to the Maritime Operations Room (MOR) in Vizag
“Have located bottomed submarine in position Dolphin light 110 4.1.”
Divers saw the Urdu initials in black, thumbing down the, smaller submarine fleet of Pakistan navy having French submarines with 200 ft length, where this one is 300 ft long and Lt. More send the another signal to MOR, “it is The Gazi”
Background:
Gazi was the cold war era US built submarine, sold to Pakaistan in 1964. She was supposed be a nightmare in 1965 war for any Indian vessels who would dare to sail away from home port, but never did anything more than killing a cow in ” Operation Dwaraka”And for this “tremendous” showcasing of her ability, It won 10 awards including two decorations of Sitara-e-Jurat and the President’s citations. The commanding officer Commander Karamat Rahman Niazi (later 4-star admiral), second-in-command Lieutenant Commander Ahmed Tasnim, and Lieutenant Zafar Muhammad Khan won a Sitara-e-Jurat and she was sent for a rapid upgraded for mine laying ability.
In War of 1971:
On 14 November, well before actual conflict, PNS Gazi set sail out of Karachi harbour with food and ammunition for Chittgong port, east Pakistan. While actual mission was only know to her Cdr Zaffar Mohammed Khan and to the very fewamong 93 heads onboard.And then…Indian Navy took the control on this game…
Vizag-4 Dec, 1971
Indian Navy intercepted a signal addressed to the naval authorities in Chittagong in East Pakistan requesting information on a special grade of lubrication oil that was used only by submarines and minesweepers. As minesweepers and the Daphne class submarines did not have the range to operate in the Bay of Bengal, it was assumed that the submarine Ghazi was stalking the Vikrant.Vice Admiral N.Krishnan was the Flag officer Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy’s eastern Naval Command at that time.The then Flagship of navy INS Vikrant’s one boiler room suffered structural crack. Reducing its speed to 16 Knm. Before PNZ Gazi could enter Indian waters, at 13 november, Vikrant to a secret location known as “Port X-Ray” at A and N islands.And navy started plotting against Gazi. FOCINC Eastern Naval command, summoned Lt-Commander Inder Singh, thecaptain of INS Rajput, an ageing destroyer which was being sent to Vizag to be decommissioned.The wily Krishnan gave Inder Singh one last mission – the Rajput was to pretend to be the Vikrant, sail 160 miles out of Vizag harbour and generate heavy wireless traffic – which would lead the enemy to believe there was a large ship in thevicinity. He then falsely informed naval authorities in Madras that the carrier would be arriving there shortly.In Vizag, he began ordering huge quantities of rations – meat and vegetables – which indicated that the fleet was in harbour. He hoped that spies in the city would pick up and transmit this intelligence. The bait was snapped up.On November 26, 1971, the Ghazi’s wireless room crackled with a terse message from the commodore, submarines:”Occupy Zone Victor with all despatch. Intelligence indicates carrier in port.” Khan altered course and sped his submarine north.Zone Victor was Vizag.
Last Moment:
Reaching Vizag on November 27, themechanical predator prowled perilously close to the Indian coast, looking for its quarry.Vice Admiral Krishnan sent for Lt.Inder Singh, the Commanding officer of the Rajput for detailed briefing at about 1600 hrs on December 1st and told him that a Pakistani submarine had been sighted off Ceylon and was absolutely certain that the submarine would be somewhere around Madras/Vishakaptanm. He made it clear that once Rajput had completed refueling, she must leave the harbor with all navigational aids switched off. Once clear of the harbor, he had to assume that an enemy submarine was in the vicinity. He was told that if the deception plan had worked, the Ghazi would be prowling about, looking for the Vikrant and in the darkness, she may mistake one of the merchantmen for the carrier and have a go or could be layinga mine-field.Due to the total blackout and navigational hazards, the submarine may even make the mistake of surfacing. The Rajput was supposed to be out of the harbor as soon as possible and along the way, it could drop a few depth charges at random. The Rajput sailed out on 2 December and returned to Vishakapatnam on 3 December and again sailed out with a pilot on board, just before the midnight of 3/4 December and on clearing the harbor, proceeded along the narrow entrance channel. When the ship was halfway in the channel, it suddenly occurred to the Captain that
“What if the Pakistani submarine was waiting outside the harbor and torpedoes us as we disembark the pilot who was on board, at the Outer Channel Buoy?”
He immediately ordered to stop engines and disembarked the pilot. He slowly increased speed to maximum by the time he reached the Outer channel buoy. Shortly after clearing the Outer channel buoy at about midnight 3/4 December, a sonar contact was obtained. The starboard lookout reported a disturbance of water, fine on the starboard bow. The captain rightly assumed that it must be a submarine diving and fired 2 depth charges at that position and proceeded. At exactly 0015 hrs two tremendous and simultaneous explosions were heard by the Coast battery, which reported it to the maritime operations room. The explosions shattered quite a few windowpanes around the coast. The Rajput got a heavy jolt after the deafening blasts. Several thousand people who were waiting to hear the Prime Minister’s broadcast to the nation also heard the explosions and many came out thinking that it was an earthquake.On the third day, The Hydrographic correction book of the PNS Ghazi and one sheet of paper with the official seal of the Commanding Officer of the Ghazi were recovered and allthe evidence was flown to New Delhi, the next morning. Thereafter, the news of the sinking hit headlines and congratulations were being poured in from all over.And, from 6 december, Vikrant started its operation setting off coast from port X.
Whenever the history will remind the some hand full no of wars, where one side despite of being completely outnumbered and outgunned by it’s enemies, showed extreme courage and valor and ultimately turn the tide of war, Battle of Longewala will come on the top line.
Battle of Longewala was one of the first major engagement between India and Pakistani forces during 1971 war. However despite of Pakistani forces were 2000 men strong and equipped with 40+ tanks they still failed to even scratch the small post guarded by just 120 Indian soldiers. The loss on Pakistani side was so high that this battle inspired the rest of Indian army heavily, and brought ultimately a glorious victory.
Background:
The main thrust of the Indian Army during the1971 warwas directed towards the eastern theatre, with the western sector envisaged as a holding operation to prevent the Pakistan Army from achieving any success that would allow the President of Pakistan,Yahya Khan, any bargaining tool to trade against the captured territories in the east.
Khan’s policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due to international pressure, and that since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area ofIndian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end,Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF’s “overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive”. The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan’s troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions. To support Khan’s troops, the PAF had launched preemptive strikes on the evening of 3 December that led to the formal commencement of hostilities. In the western theatre, the town of Rahim Yar Khan, close to the international border,formed a critical communication centre for Khan’s forces and, situated on the Sindh — Punjab railway, remained a vulnerable link on Khan’s logistics. The fall of Rahim Yar Khan to Indian forces would cut off the rail as well as road link between Sindh and Punjab, starving Khan’s forces of fuel and ammunitions delivered to Karachi.
Pakistani Tactical Plan:
Pakistan’s tactical plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Divisions task in the Sri Ganganagar area. Pakistan High command also felt that it was important to protect the North-South road link which they felt was vulnerable as it was close to the border. A Combined Arms Plan was decided upon. This involved two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments. A separate division, the 18 Division, was formed for this purpose. 18 Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade (206) with an Armoured Regiment (38 Cavalry) to capture and establish a firm base at Longewala, a junction on the Indian road system and 51st Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Cavalry (Pakistan Army Armoured Corps) to operate beyond Longewala to capture Jaisalmer.
Indian Tactical Plan:
Indian battle plans called for a strike across the international border with the 12th Indian division towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala, subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure Rahim Yar Khan, which would not only destabilise the Pakistani defences in the Punjab, but also in the Jammu & Kashmir Sector, allowingthe planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh sector to sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there.
Objectives in Longewala:
The Pakistani plan was to reach Longewala, Ramgarh and Jaisalmer”. The plan was far-fetched from the start, if only because it called for a night attack to be conducted over terrain that was not preceded by route or engineer reconnaissance, and the armoured troops were therefore unaware of the ground surface that could not support rapid movement towards the objective.
Longewala was an isolated post without any outside support or any defensive minefield. It was an important location because, if it fell, the enemy would have captured vast swathes of Indian territory all the way up to Jaisalmer.
Indian Defence:
On the Indian side, the Longewala post was held by the A company of the 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, led by Major K S Chandpuri, the defences occupying a high sand dune which dominated the area that was largely intractable to vehicles. The post was surrounded by a barbed wire fence of three stands. The rest of the battalion was located at Sadhewala, 17 km north-east of the Longewala post. Chandpuri commanded an infantry company reinforced by a section each of MMGs and L16 81mm Mortar, and one Jeep-mounted RCL. His two other recoilless rifle teams of the anti-tank section were under training at the battalion headquarters. Major Chandpuri also had under his command a four-man team of the camel Border Security Force division. The Longewala post had no armoured vehicles, but artillery support was available from a battery of 170 Field Regiment (Veer Rajput) tasked in direct support to the battalion, and 168 Field Regiment which had been deployed to the area in secrecy just a day earlier. The direct support battery was attached to the 168 Field Regiment and served as its “Sierra” Battery. Immediately after PAF strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December, Chandpuri dispatched a 20-man strong patrol under Lieutenant Dharam Veer to Boundary Pillar (BP) 638, on the international border. This patrol was to play an important part in detecting the Pakistani forces.
The Battle:
In this battle Indians were totally outnumbered. Chandpuri and his men only had a section of MMG’s, 2 Recoil-less Gun detachments and 81mm Mortars with which they kept Brig. Tariq Mir-led army of 2000-3000 Pak soldiers equipped with 50+ Sherman and T-59 China-made tanks at bay for good six hours of the night.
Major Chandpuri knew, escaping from the advancing Pakistani forces is impossible, because if the Indian Army vacate the post and try to go far away by foot, advancing tanks would catch them quickly and would smash them without facing any problem in open land . So, he decided to make the post an impenetrable fort and made brilliant battle plan.
Major Chandpuri had demanded aerial assistance from the Indian Air Force, which, sadly, was turned down because they did not have fighter jets with night vision in the fleet. This had left Chandpuri and his battalion of 120 odd soldiers (comprising 23rd Punjab Regiment (Sikhs) and handful of Indian Border Security Force (BSF Rajputs), to defend the post of Longewala despite heavy odds from the strong Pakistani Army of 2000-3000 men. The Indian troops battled the Pak army with all their valour and held the the enemy at bay through the night till the Indian Air Force arrived at the break of dawn.
During the night of the 4th, Lt. Veer’s platoon conducting a patrol detected noises across the border that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching.These were soon confirmed by reports — from the Army’s Air Observation Post aircraft flown by Maj. Atma Singh — in the area of a 20 km long armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post. Directing Lt Veer’s patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri got in touch with the battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support. Battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put, and containing the attack as much as possible, or carrying out a tactical retreat of the company to Ramgarh, as reinforcements would not be available for at least six hours. Considering that Chandpuri’s command had no transportation, and was facing a mobile enemy, he decided to maintain the defensive position of the post where his troops at least had the benefit of prepared defensive works, rather than conducting a withdrawal at night that was a far riskier option.The Pakistani forces began their attack at 12:30 am. As the offensive approached the lone outpost, Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns, killing five of the ten camels from the BSF detachment. As the column of 65 tanks neared the post, Indian defences, lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield, laid a hasty anti-tank minefield as the enemy advanced, one infantryman being killed in the process. The Indian infantry held fire until the leading Pakistani tanks had approached to 15–30 metres before firing their PIATs. They accounted for the first two tanks on the track with their Jeep-mounted 106 mm M40 recoilless rifle,[18]with one of its crew being killed during the combat. This weapon proved quite effective because it was able to engage the thinner top armour of the Pakistani tanks from its elevated position, firing at often stationary bogged down vehicles. In all the post defenders claimed 12 tanks destroyed or damaged. The initial Pakistani attack stalled almost immediately when the infantry discovered the barbed wire which was unseen in the night, and interpreted it to signify a minefield. Firing for the Indian RCL crews was made easier by the flames of fires when the spare fuel tanks on the Pakistani tanks, intended to supplement their internal capacity for the advance to Jaisalmer, exploded, at once providing ample light for Indians located on higher ground, and creating a dense acrid smoke screen at ground level for the Pakistani infantry, adding to the confusion. Two hours were lost as Pakistani sappers were brought up, only to discover there was no minefield. However, at this time Pakistani infantry were required to make another attack, from a different direction, but in the dawn light. The Pakistani advance then attempted to surround the post two hours later by vehicles getting off the road, but many vehicles, particularly armoured personnel carriers and tanks, in trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking, became bogged in the soft sand of the area surrounding the post. Throughout the engagement Major Chandpuri continued to direct the supporting artillery fire. Although massively outnumbering the Indian defenders, and having surrounded them, the Pakistani troops were unable to advance over open terrain on a full-moon night,[16]under small arms and mortar fire from the outpost. This encouraged the Indians not to give up their strong defensive position, frustrating the Pakistani commanders. As dawn arrived, the Pakistan forces had still not taken the post, and were now having to do so in full daylight. In the morning the Indian Air Force was finally able to direct someHF-24 Maruts and Hawker Hunter aircraft to assist the post; they were not outfitted with night vision equipment, and so were delayed from conducting combat missions until dawn.[19]With daylight, however, the IAF was able to operate effectively, with the strike aircraft being guided to the targets by the airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC) Major Atma Singh in a HAL Krishak.[20]The Indian aircraft attacked the Pakistani ground troops with the 16 Matra T-10 rockets and30 mm cannon fire on each aircraft. Without support from the Pakistan Air Force, which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF’s Hunters. The range of the 12.7 mm anti-aircraftheavy machine gunsmounted on the tanks was limited and therefore ineffective against the Indian jets. Indian air attacks were made easier by the nature of the barren terrain. Many IAF officers later described the attack as a ‘Turkey Shoot’ signifying the lopsidedness. By noon the next day, the assault ended completely, having cost Pakistan 22 tanks claimed destroyed by aircraft fire, 12 by ground anti-tank fire, and some captured after being abandoned, with a total of 100 vehicles claimed to have been destroyed or damaged in the desert around the post. The Pakistani attack was first halted, and then Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw when Indian tanks from division’s cavalry regiment the 20 Lancers, Commanded by Col Bawa Guruvachan Singh, and the 17th Rajputana Rifles launched their counter-offensive to end the sixth our combat;Longewala had proved to be one of the defining moments in the war.
Casualties:
Indian casualties in the battle were two soldiers along with one of their jeep mounted recoil-less rifles knocked out. Whereas , 200 Pakistani soldiers were killed and 34 tanks along with 500 support vehicles were destroyed. The Battle of Longewala saw the largest disproportionate tank casualties for one side in a single battle afterWorld War II.
Reason’s behind India’s decisive victory:
(1) Longewala was a pretty solid defensive position. The Indian defenses were elevated withgood fields of fire, so infantry assaults were futile, and because of the nature of the terrain vehicles couldn’t easily get at the fighting positions.
(2) Pakistan’s tactical intelligence was lacking. The Pakistanis on a number of occasions during the battle held back instead of pressing forward for fear of mines that were not there.
(3) Air superiority. While the Longewala defenses held well through the first night of the attack, the thing that really turned the battle into a massacre was the IAF’s devastating air attack the next morning. The Pakistani armored units were out in the open with no cover or concealment on flat terrain and didn’t have guns that could effectively be used against planes. They were sitting ducks for Indian rocket fire.
Interests of foreign nations in the battle:
The British media significantly exploited the defence of Longewala. James Hatter compared the Battle of Longewala as to Battle of Thermopylae in his article Taking on the enemy at Longewala describing it as the deciding moment of the 1971 war. Similarly, Field Marshal R.M. Carver, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, visited Longewala a few weeks after the war to learn the details of the battle from Major Chandpuri.
Awards:
For his part, the Indian company commander Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was decorated with India’s second highest gallantry award, the Maha Vir Chakra. Several other awards were earned by members of the defending company, and the battalion’s commander.
Popular Culture:
1997 Blockbuster Bollywood movie Border was based on Battle of Longewala
Credits:
Wikipedia
Quora
And many others… .
Major Kuldip Singh ChandpuriChandpuri and his menMarks of Tank tracksVictory!
INDRA 